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BROADCASTING IN EUROPE:
ECONOMICS BECOME A DECISIVE FACTOR
Willem F Korthals Altes*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1950's, six European countries' concluded a series of treaties
establishing the European Community ("EC").2 Europe was still recover-
ing from the Second World War and trying to create a safe and prosperous
society for its citizens. At the time, the drafters of the treaties focused on
agriculture, coal and steel, and other down-to-earth matters. None of the
treaties mentioned radio or television. It is likely that nobody involved in
making these documents even considered the possibility that broadcasting
issues might be solved by their efforts. In the 1950's, broadcasting was
generally considered a public service, organized and regulated at the
national level and often with heavy government involvement.3 It was not
seen as a matter to be dealt with in terms of free trade or on the basis of
economic considerations.
At best, scholars and lawmakers were willing to treat radio and televi-
sion as elements of the freedom of expression.4 But the scarcity of
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Scholar, New York University School of Law, 1992; Adjunct Professor and Affiliated Scholar,
Communications Media Center, New York Law School; Doctor of Law, University of Amsterdam,
1989; M.CJ., New York University School of Law, 1982; Admitted to the New York State Bar,
1983.
1. These six countries were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
2. See TREATY ESTABLISEING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNrrY [ECSE
TREATY]; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY];
EUROPEAN TREATY ESTABUSHNG THE ATOMIc ENERGY COMMUNTY [EURATOM TREATY]. This
article will focus on the EEC Treaty. See generally D. LASOK & J.W. BRmGE, AN INTRODuc-
TION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1987); A. PARRY
& S. HARDY, EEC LAw (1973); A.G. TOTH, THE OxFoRD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EUROPEAN
CoMMuNrry LAw (1990); DERICK WYATr & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANInVE LAW OF TmE
EEC (1980).
3. See Case 155/73, Sacchi v. Italy, 1974 E.C.R. 410, 443 (the opinion of Advocate General
G. Reisch); Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common
Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable (Communication From the Commission
to the Council) COM (84)300 final at 63 [hereinafter Green Paper].
4. JAN M. DE MEJ, UrINGsVRIHEID: DE VRIE INFORMATrESTROOM IN GRONDWETELUK
PERs EcEF 154 (1989) (Neth.).
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frequencies and the alleged pervasiveness of the broadcasting media were
generally accepted as reasons for imposing more severe restrictions on them
than on other forms of expression, such as publishing in writing.5 It was
not until 1990 that the European Court of Human Rights ruled that under
the European Human Rights Convention the broadcasting media should
essentially be dealt with on the same footing as the press.6 By that time,
the Court of Justice of the EC had already developed a body of case law,
which may have caused broadcasting in Europe to be perceived and
regulated differently.7
The decisions of both European courts and simultaneous regulatory
activities in the Council of Europe and the EC raise two issues. The first
is whether considerations of an economic nature have replaced culture and
freedom of expression as the foundations on which broadcasting in Europe
should be built. A related and even more far-reaching issue is whether
European law still permits the maintenance of public broadcasting systems
as they have traditionally existed in the Member States of the EC and the
Council of Europe. Such systems are arguably mandated by European law.
But, the most recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European
Community and the European Court of Human Rights could also be read
as holding that government regulation of broadcasting should be as limited
as possible.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUN rY
A. Sacchi v. Italy
1. The Facts
In September 1972, Giuseppe Sacchi of Biella, Italy, started a business
under the name Telebiella with the purpose of installing television sets in
public places where people could watch programs received by cable.8
Telebiella's services were financed in part by broadcast advertisements. 9
5. Id
6. See infra part IIIB.
7. See infra part IL
8. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 409 (1974).
9. For a detailed description of the facts, see the Opinion of the Advocate General, Mr. G.
Reischl. Id at 425. Mr. Sacchi also filed a complaint with the European Commission of Human
Rights of the Council of Europe. See Giuseppe Sacchi v. Italy, App. No. 645274, 5 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 43, 49 (1976). The complaint challenged the compatibility of the
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In the early 1970's, the transmission of radio and television programs in
Italy was still the exclusive monopoly of the national radio and television
authority, RAI.' ° Owners of radio and television sets had to pay a license
fee for the reception of broadcast programs"
In January 1973, Mr. Sacchi was prosecuted for operating his business
without paying the license fee. 2 He was acquitted, however, because the
Pretore (Magistrate) of Biella found that the law applied to broadcasting
only and not to cablecasting. 3 After a Presidential Decree assimilated
cable television equipment to broadcasting equipment on March 29, 1973,
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications ordered Telebiella to
dismantle its operation.14 On the basis of the same decree, Mr. Sacchi
was also criminally prosecuted before the Tribunale of Biella. s
Mr. Sacchi argued that the license fee only served to finance RAI.6
All RAI had, however, was an exclusive right to transmit radio and
television programs over the air. Therefore, in his opinion the fee could
not be imposed if equipment was installed solely for the purpose of
receiving programs by cable. If the RAI monopoly extended to cable
transmission, there would be an infringement of the provisions of the
European Economic Treaty ("EEC Treaty") on the free movement of goods
and on free competition. Because of these potential implications of EC
law, the Biella court stayed the proceedings and referred the case to the
Court of Justice of the EC for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the
EEC Treaty.
17
relevant provisions of Italian law with Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and five protocols. Iii The Commission did not
reach the substance of Mr. Sachi's complaint because he "had not exhausted the remedies which
were available to him under Italian law" as required by Article 27(3) of the Convention. Id. at
52.
10. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 410.
11. See i. at 432 (citing Decree Law No. 246 of Feb. 21, 1938, as amended).
12. Id.
13. Sacchi v. Italy, App. No. 6452/74, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 48 (1976).
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 419.
17. Id. at 445. The text of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty states as follows:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of the Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the
institutions of the Community; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies
established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
19931
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The Tribunale posed eleven questions. The most important of these
pertained to the applicability of some fundamental principles of EC law.
The first principal issue was whether the provisions on the free movement
of goods applied to television signals, in particular their commercial
aspects, and whether the exclusive right granted by Italian law to RAI to
license all types of television transmissions, including commercial
advertising, constituted a breach of this principle." Another predominant
issue was whether the way that Italian law permitted RAI to operate
amounted to an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 86.19
The Sacchi case was novel in that the court had never given an
opinion on the applicability of EC law to broadcasting.2" Radio and
television were not mentioned in the Treaty, and, at the time it was
completed, very few people, if any, thought of broadcasting as an issue to
be dealt with under the Treaty. The arguments brought forward by several
interested parties reflected this situation. The German and Italian govern-
ments, for instance, emphasized the nature of radio and television as a




Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal
of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
EEC TREATY art. 177.
18. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 432.
19. Id. at 427. The text of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty states as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such
abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
EEC TREATY art. 86.
20. See Ivo B. SCMWARTZ, EUROPE AND THE MEDIA: EEC REPORT 8 (1984) (Report for the
llth FIDE Congress, The Hague).
21. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 417-18.
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2. The Position of the Court of Justice of the EC
In addressing the issues posed by Sacchi v. Italy, the court of Justice
started by taking a rather surprising step. While most parties argued their
positions in terms of the free movement of goods under Article 30 EEC
Treaty,= the court held:
In the absence of [an] express provision to the contrary in the
Treaty, a television signal must, by reason of its nature, be
regarded as provision of services. Although it is not ruled out
that services normally provided for remuneration may come under
the provisions relating to free movement of goods, such is
however the case, as appears from Article 60, only insofar as they
are governed by such provisions. It follows that the transmission
of television signals, including those in the nature of adver-
tisements, comes, as such, within the rules of the Treaty relating
to services.'
In other words, the court did not consider broadcasting as an aspect of the
free movement of goods, but as an element of the freedom to provide
services under Articles 59 to 66 of the EEC Treaty. The free movement of
goods was relevant, however, because the Court made a distinction between
broadcasting and related activities, stating:
[Tirade in material, sound recordings, films, apparatus and other
products used for the diffusion of television signals are subject to
the rules relating to freedom of movement for goods. As a result,
although the existence of a monopoly with regard to television
advertising is not in itself contrary to the principle of free
movement of goods, such a monopoly would contravene this
principle if it discriminated in favour of national material and
22. Defendant Sacchi, for instance, contended the following:
[A]dvertising should be regarded as an intangible asset in its own right, or at least
as having, to the products to which it relates, the relationship of accessory to
principal, and on this double basis it is subject to the customs union and the principle
of the free movement of goods. It appears from the case law of this Court that
intangible assets--such as electricity-come under the application of these rules and
all products on which a monetary value can be placed, and which are as such capable
of being the object of commercial transactions, must be regarded as goods. This
assimilation of the advertisement with the product is indispensable for progressive
unification of the market, effective equality of opportunity for penetration and
distribution which is not beyond the means of all save the large multinational
undertakings.
Id. at 426 (citations omitted).
23. Id.
19931
246 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol.13
products... [and if it] were used to favour,- within the Commu-
nity, particular trade channels or particular commercial operators
in relation to others.'
As to the competition issue of Article 86, the Court of Justice held that
"[n]othing in the Treaty prevents Member States, for considerations of
public interest of a non-economic nature, from removing radio and
television transmissions, including cable transmissions from the field of
competition by conferring on one or more establishments an exclusive right
to conduct them."
This did not mean that there were no limitations on the powers such
an establishment could be given. The prohibitions against discrimination
on the basis of nationality and residence remained in effect. Moreover, if
the performance of its tasks would include activities of an economic nature,
the establishment would not be permitted to have a dominant position. But,
as a whole, "the fact that an undertaking to which a Member State grants
exclusive rights has a monopoly is not as such incompatible with Article
86."76
Due to the nature of the proceedings, the Court of Justice did not
decide whether Mr. Sacchi had to pay the license fee.2" That was for the
national courts of Italy to determine. The significance of the court's
opinion lies in the fact that it brought broadcasting within the realm of the
EEC Treaty as an activity of an economic nature subject to the harmoniza-
tion principles of this document.'
The Sacchi decision did not make clear to what extent national
legislatures would still be permitted to maintain monopolistic and protective
24. I
25. Id at 428.
26. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 429. This did not mean, of course, that national governments
could prohibit the reception of programs from abroad. In the case of broadcasting by air, such
a prohibition would infringe upon the freedom to receive information under Article 10 of the
European Human Rights Convention. See generally note 5 and accompanying text. The Court
did not say in so many words that the retransmission by cable of foreign broadcasts could not be
subject to limitations. Id.
27. See D. LASOK & J. W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTONS oFiHE EuRoPEAN COMMUNrrES
316 (1987). See generally ARTICLE 177 EEC: EXPERIENCES AND PROBLEMS (Henry G.
Schermers et al., eds. 1987).
28. Schwartz contends that the EEC Treaty encompasses broadcasting in many ways. In
addition to the elements mentioned by the court in Sacchi, he lists, inter alia, broadcasters in their
capacity of persons engaging in self-employed activity, employees of broadcasting organizations,
and broadcasting organizations as undertakings engaged in competition. See SCHWARTZ, supra
note 20, at 2-3. Schwartz is right, but the categories he mentions are not typical for broadcasting
activities.
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structures. Neither the freedom to provide services nor the provisions
against the abuse of dominant positions mandated the complete abolition of
rules containing exclusivity for national broadcasters. But it was obvious
that measures of an economic nature would be considered suspect.
B. Procureur du Roi v. Marc J.VC. Debauve
1. The Background
The next case, Procureur du Roi v. Marc J.VC. Debauve,29 provided
some clarity, although here too the position of the government was upheld.
Debauve was also referred to the Court of Justice on the basis of Article
177 of the EEC Treaty.3 Marc Debauve and several other individuals and
organizations were prosecuted before the Tribunal Correctionnel (Criminal
Court) of Liege, Belgium. They were accused of violating a provision of
Belgian law prohibiting the transmission by cable of any broadcast in the
nature of a commercial advertisement.
31
While other European countries were gradually introducing commercial
advertisements on radio and television, the Belgian legislature decided that
viewers and listeners in their country should not be exposed to such forms
of expression.32 It was relatively easy to enforce the ban on advertise-
ments for the national broadcasting organizations. But with the advent of
cable, it became increasingly difficult as cable operators wanted to
distribute foreign programs to their subscribers. At first, the cable
companies made a serious effort to comply with the law by either limiting
their options to programs without commercials or by leaving out the
advertisements altogether.33
However, the increase of foreign programs with commercials and the
technical and organizational difficulties of leaving out advertisements made
the cable companies become less strict in their compliance with the law.3
The government, in turn, made little effort to enforce the prohibition on
advertisements. 5 In Debauve, the underlying action was initiated by
organizations of consumers, guardians of cultural interests, and women who
29. Case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v. Marc J.V.C. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. 833 (1988).
30. See supra text accompanying note 17.
31. See Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. at 836.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 839.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 853.
1993]
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wanted to protect consumers and children against the detrimental effect of
commercial messages.36
In their case before the Tribunal Correctionnel, the defending cable
operators argued, inter alia, that the provisions on the prohibition of
advertisements were incompatible with Articles 59 to 66 of the EEC Treaty
dealing with the freedom to provide services."7 The court stayed the
proceedings and referred the case to the Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling.
2. Relevant Elements within a Single Member State
The European Court reiterated its holding of the Sacchi case that the
"broadcasting of television signals, including those in the nature of
advertisements, comes, as such, within the rules of the Treaty relating to
services. 38 Although the court added that "[t]here is no reason to treat
the transmission of such signals by cable television any differently," 39 it
made some additional distinctions.
First, the court pointed out that "the provisions of the Treaty on
freedom to provide services cannot apply to activities whose relevant
elements are confined within a single Member State.' '4° Second, it held
that laws such as the one in question "cannot be regarded as a restriction
upon [the] freedom to provide services so long as those laws treat all such
services identically whatever their origin or the nationality or place of
establishment of the persons providing them."'4 The court acknowledged
the desire of the Belgian legislature to ban broadcast advertisements and
pointed out that, in the absence of harmonized rules in this regard, the
underlying prohibition fell within the residual power of each Member State
to regulate advertising on grounds of general interest.42
Finally, the European Court held that the Belgian provisions did not
discriminate against foreign broadcasting stations because their signals
could be broadcast only within the natural reception zone. The European
36. The Fiddration Nationale du Mouvement Coopdratif F6minin, Organisation de
Consommateurs, the Fdration Beige des Cooporatives, and Vie F6minine initiated the action.
Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. at 864-65.
37. Id. at 836.
38. Id. at 855.
39. Id.
40. M
41. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. at 856.
42. 1d at 857.
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court referred to the differences between viewers living near the border,
who were able to receive foreign programs by air, and those living further
inland or near the North Sea, who depended on cable. The European Court
said that "such differences, which are due to national phenomena, cannot
be described as 'discrimination' within the meaning of the Treaty; the latter
regards only differences in treatment arising from human activity, and
especially from measures taken by public authorities, as discrimination."'
C. Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands
1. The Cable Regulations
Although Sacchi and Debauve established the EC's authority over
broadcasting, the scope of the authority was still fairly limited. National
monopolies continued to be permitted, advertising (an activity of an
economic nature) could be prohibited, and the provisions on the freedom
to provide services had little impact if the measures taken by national
governments (a) affected their territory only, (b) pursued a non-economic
purpose of general interest, and (c) gave nationals and foreigners equal
treatment.
These three elements were of major importance in the next case which
came before the Court of Justice, Bond van Adverteerders v. Nether-
lands.4 Under the so-called Cable Regulations,45 cable networks in the
Netherlands were prohibited from distributing programs from abroad
(except upon permission from the Minister of Cultural Affairs) if they
contained commercial advertisements specifically intended for the Dutch
public, or if they contained subtitles in Dutch.46
43. Id. at 858.
44. Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R. 2085 (1988). This
case is also known as the Kabelregeling (Cable Regulations) case.
45. Ministerial Regulations of July 27, 1984 (Staatscourant 1984) (concerning the use of
antenna installations for the transmission of radio and television programs). These regulations
were based on the Omroepwet [Broadcasting Act] of 1967 (Staaasblad 1967), which in 1987 was
replaced by the Act of April 21, 1987 (Staatsblad 1987), containing rules concerning radio and
television programs, the broadcasting fee, and subsidies to press institutions better known under
its short title of Mediawet [Media Act]. MEDIAWEr art.l (Neth.) (Staatsblad 1987).
46. KABELREGELING art.4 (Neth.) (Staatscourant 1984).
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The Dutch advertisers challenged the rules because they felt restricted
in their ability to convey commercial messages to the Dutch public.4' In
their civil suit against the Dutch government, the advertisers contended that
the Cable Regulations violated the provisions on the freedom to provide
services in the EEC Treaty. The Dutch court asked the Court of Justice for
a preliminary ruling on the basis of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.4'
Since the Debauve case, the media landscape of Europe had changed
substantially. Several countries were in the process of permitting commer-
cially operated organizations to broadcast television programs next to, or
even in the place of, the traditional public broadcasting institutions. 9
Broadcasting satellites and cable networks were developing rapidly. The
EC was discussing a draft for a Council Directive on Broadcasting by
Television, based on a Green Paper entitled "Television Without Frontiers"
issued by the EC Commission in 1984.50
Under these circumstances, it was understandable that the Dutch
government would have a harder time defending its position than the Italian
and Belgian governments in 1974 and 1980, respectively. Moreover, its
case was obviously weaker. The Dutch government first contended that EC
law, and the freedom to provide services across borders in particular, was
not at stake. The government argued that the only relevant service was that
provided by Dutch cable networks to Dutch subscribers. In other words,
in the view of the Dutch government, it was a purely domestic service.5 '
Second, even if the provisions on the freedom to provide services were
applicable, the regulations restricting the broadcast of foreign programs by
cable were justified in the general interest of media pluralism and non-
commerciality, the cornerstones of the Dutch broadcasting system.52
Finally, the Dutch government believed that the Cable Regulations did not
discriminate against foreign nationals because the Dutch broadcasting
associations were subject to the same limitations.5 The administration of
47. They were also unhappy with the limited amount of advertising time available on Dutch
public television. It is quite likely that challenging the Cable Regulations they were trying to
pressure the Dutch government to lift some of these limitations. See Bond van Adverteerders,
1988 E.C.R. at 2127.
48. The Rechtbank (District Court) of The Hague found that the ban on advertising was
consistent with EC principles but suspended the operation of the prohibition on subtitling. On
appeal, the Gerechishof (Appellate Court) of The Hague maintained the Rechtbank's ruling but
suspended its final opinion pending the case before the European Court. Id. at 2128.
49. Green Paper, supra note 3, at 213.
50. Id at 328.
51. Bond van Adverteerders, 1988 E.C.R. at 2109.
52. Id. at 2135.
53. Id at 2133.
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advertising on Dutch radio and television was exclusively carried out by an
independent foundation, the Stichting Ether Reclame ("STER"), which
deposited the proceeds in a broadcasting fund used to finance the programs
produced by the broadcasting associations.'
2. 7wo Transfrontier Services
The Court of Justice disagreed on all counts. First, the court held:
[Tihe transmission of programmes at issue involves at least two
separate services. The first is provided by the cable network
operators established in one [Mlember State to the broadcasters
established in other Member States and consists of relaying to
network subscribers the television programmes sent to them by
the broadcasters. The second is provided by the broadcasters
established in particular in the [Miember State where the
programmes are received, by broadcasting advertisements which
the advertisers have prepared especially for the public in the
[Miember State where the programmes are received. Each of
those services are transfrontier services for the purposes of Article
59 of the Treaty. In each case the suppliers of the service are
established in a Member State other than that of certain of the
persons for whom it is intended.55
The European court also differed with the Dutch government on the
discrimination issue. While the broadcasting associations were not
permitted to advertise, the STER had the exclusive authority to do so in
their interest. According to the Court, "the situation of the Dutch television
stations as a whole should be compared with that of the foreign broadcast-
ers.
' 56
The Court of Justice pointed out that, although national rules may
discriminate against foreign nationals and residents, if the rules are justified
on grounds of public policy, economic aims cannot constitute such
grounds.57 One such legitimate aim is to secure, for a national public
foundation, all of the revenue from advertising intended especially for the
public of the Member State in question.
54. Id See also MEDIAWEr arLI (Neth.) (Staatblad 1987).
55. Id at 2133.
56. Bond van Adverteerders, 1988 E.C.R. at 2135.
57. Id
1993]
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The Court did not enter into the debate over the validity of the
government's arguments on pluralism and non-commerciality. It simply
stated that "[tihe Dutch government itself admits that there are less
restrictive, non-discriminatory ways of achieving the intended objec-
tives.""8  So-called objective restrictions were acceptable,59 restrictions
of an economic nature were not. In other words, unlike the Belgian
provisions in Debauve, the Dutch Cable Regulations did not meet the non-
discrimination test.
The Kabelregeling case was thus the first in which the European court
ruled against a government defending its public broadcasting system.
Although the Court provided some clarity on the acceptability of discrimi-
natory national rules, it did not give an express opinion on arguments of
culture, pluralism, and non-commerciality as grounds for discrimination on
the basis of nationality or residence. The Groppera case would be more
explicit in this respect.
11. "THE OTHER EUROPE:" THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
A. The Human Rights Convention
During the time period of the preceding cases, many developments in
"the other Europe," the Council of Europe, were occurring. The Council
of Europe was founded in 1949 as a political organization set up to foster
greater unity and cooperation between the people and nations of Europe.'
Until recently, the Council had 21 members, all non-communist European
countries. The democratization process in Eastern Europe caused an influx
of new members.6'
The most important document of the Council is the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECPRFF").62 Individuals who feel deprived of a right under this
58. Id.
59. Examples given by the Court were prohibitions on advertising certain products, advertising
on certain days, and limiting the duration or the frequency of advertisements. Bond van
Adverteerders, 1988 E.C.R. at 2135.
60. See THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: A CONCISE GUIDE 11 (1982). The Council of Europe
was established on September 2, 1949, by the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities
of the Council of Europe. The original twelve members were Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
Id
61. See New York Times articles available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NYT File.
62. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (hereinafter "ECPHRFF').
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Convention can complain to the European Commission of Human Rights.63
The Commission attempts to arrange a settlement between the individual
and the Member State against which the complaint is filed." If a
settlement cannot be reached, the Commission will report to the Committee
of Ministers. Within three months, either the State or the Commission can
take the case to the European Court of Human Rights. Although the Court
has no enforcement powers of its own, governments are bound to comply
with its judgments. 6s Enforcement is supervised through the Committee
of Ministers, which consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
Member States."
Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention deals with the freedom of
expression.67 The first paragraph sets forth the general scope of freedom
of expression in all its aspects. The second paragraph states that national
law may subject the freedoms to certain limitations, provided they are
necessary in a democratic society in one or more of the listed interests.
The phrase "necessary in a democratic society" is particularly
important because it gives the court the opportunity to create common
standards applicable to all Member States. In several cases, national
regulations were found to be in violation of Article 10 only, or for the most
part, because they failed to meet the "necessary in a democratic society" test."
63. Id. at 236-38 (art. 25).
64. I at 238-40 (art. 28).
65. Id at 248 (art. 53).
66. Id at 248 (art. 54).
67. The text of Article 10 of the ECPHRFF reads as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
ECPHRFF, supra note 62, at 230 (art. 10).
68. Examples of cases of the European Court of Human Rights in the area of freedom of
expression include the following: Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1976); The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct HR. (ser. A) (1979); Lingens v.
Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. ILR. (ser. A) (1986); The Observer and the Guardian v. United Kingdom,
216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991); Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. HJR. (ser. A) (1992).
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B. Applicability to Broadcasting
Until recently, it was uncertain to what extent Article 10 applied to
broadcasting. The uncertainty was caused by the third sentence of the first
paragraph of this provision: "This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises."
Some scholars and courts believed that the language and the placing of this
sentence in the first paragraph meant that the second paragraph did not
apply to broadcasting. 69 In other words, broadcasting could be subject to
more limitations than other forms of expression.
The European Court of Human Rights put an end to this debate in the
case of Groppera, the first case in which it had the opportunity to deal with
the issue.7" In 1979, Belton Srl, a company under Italian law, built a
radio transmitter on the Pizzo Groppera, a mountain peak in Italy close to
the Swiss border. Under the name of Radio 24 AG, programs intended for
the Swiss audience between 15 and 40 years of age were broadcast from
the Groppera. The programs were financed by advertisements.
Until 1982, broadcasting in Switzerland was the exclusive monopoly
of the Swiss Radio Broadcasting Company. In 1982, an ordinance ended
this monopoly and made it possible for private organizations to run local
radio stations. 2 Radio 24 AG was one of the 36 applicants who received
a license.7 3 Radio 24 AG's license was obtained for the Zufrich area and
subject to the condition that the broadcasts from the Groppera would cease.
The owner agreed but sold the station to Groppera Radio AG, a company
under Swiss law which started broadcasting under the name of Sound
Radio. Sound Radio's programs were also intended for the Zirich
listening area.
In addition to the broadcasts by air, Sound Radio's programs were
retransmitted by several cable operators. On January 1, 1984, most cable
networks ceased carrying Sound Radio because a 1983 Ordinance
prohibited the distribution of programs other than those which complied
with national and international telecommunications regulations.' Only
some cable companies, inter alia the Community-Antenna Cooperative of
69. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 28.
70. Groppera Radio AG v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
71. Id. at 10 (para. 12).
72. See id. (para. 13).
73. Id (para. 14).
74. Mai at 10-11 (para. 15).
75. Groppera. 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at I 1 (para. 17).
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Maur, continued to retransmit Sound Radio.76 The Swiss authorities
instituted an administrative action against the cooperative of Maur and tried
to take action via the Italian government and the authorities of the
International Telecommunications Union ('TJFU").' On August 30, 1984,
the transmitter on the Pizzo Groppera was struck by lightning and the
broadcasts came to an end.' s
Although this act of God made the cases essentially moot, the
defending cooperative and the owners of the radio transmitter, who had
joined in the action, did not want the broadcasts to be terminated. 9 They
sought a decision on issues concerning legal principals. In addition,
Groppera Radio AG claimed that it would resume the broadcasts. The
defendants contended in particular that the measures taken by the Swiss
government violated Article 10 of the ECPHRFF.' After the Swiss courts
had rejected their pleas, the defendants filed a complaint with the European
Commission of Human Rights."' Finally, the case came before the
European Court of Human Rights.
C. The Court of Human Rights on Groppera
The Court of Human Rights first decided that Groppera Radio AG was
a victim under Article 25 of the Convention because it was "directly
affected by the act or omission which is in issue."' The court noted that
the owners of Sound Radio were particularly struck by the ordinance
prohibiting the cable networks from retransmitting their programs.
76. Id at II (para. 18).
77. I& at 14 (para. 26).
78. 1 at 12 (para. 22).
79. Id. (para. 24).
80. Groppera, 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (pain. 52). For the text of Article 10 of the
ECPHRFF, see supra text accompanying note 67.
81. The Commission concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10. Id. at 19 (para.
44).
82. Id. at 20 (para. 47). The text of Article 25, § I reads as follows:
The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Contracting
Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognises the
competence of the Commission to receive such petitions. Those of the High
Contracting Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any
way the effective exercise of this right.
ECPHRFF, supra note 62, at 236-38.
1993]
256 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
The court of' Human Rights then rejected -the Swiss government's
argument that Article 10 did not apply because there was doubt whether the
radio station broadcast "information" and "ideas":
Mhe Court does not consider it necessary to give on this
occasion a precise definition of what is meant by "information"
and "ideas".... [B]oth broadcasting of programmes over the air
and cable retransmission of such programmes are covered by the
right enshrined in the first two sentences of Article 10 § 1,
without there being any need to make distinctions according to
the content of the programmes.s3
Next, the court turned to the central issue of the case: Whether the
interference by the Swiss government with the rights of the owners of the
radio station was justified. The Swiss government, referring to the third
sentence of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention and its obligations under the
International Telecommunications Convention, claimed that it was justified
in imposing a license system on the broadcasting of radio programs.'
The Court of Human Rights agreed that the third sentence of Article 10 §
1 was applicable. However, it disagreed on the scope of its application
stating that § 1 must be considered within the entire context of Article 10,
especially in relation to the paragraph 2 requirements:85
Mhe purpose of the third sentence of Article 10 § 1 of the
Convention is to make it clear that States are permitted to control
by a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised
[sic] in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects. It
does not, however, provide that licensing measures shall not
otherwise be subject to the requirements of paragraph 2, for that
would lead to a result contrary to the object and purpose of
Article 10 taken as a whole.
86
In other words, the licensing of broadcasting activities was not exempt from
the restrictions of the second paragraph of Article 10. The Court of Human
Rights now had to determine whether the measures taken by the Swiss
government complied with the limitations of this paragraph. Two hurdles
had to be overcome in this respect. One difficulty was the question of
whether the measures were prescribed by law. The applicants contended
that the regulations were not sufficiently accessible or precise for a citizen
to adapt his behavior to them, "even after consulting a lawyer, if neces-
83. Groppera, 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (para. 55).
84. Id (pam. 56).
85. Id at 24 (pam. 61).
86. Id (emphasis added).
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sary."'  The court, applying a three-fold test,88 concluded that the
applicants, wishing to engage in broadcasting across a frontier, could
become fully aware of the applicable rules.89
The second hurdle was whether the measures were necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of (1) the prevention of disorder in
telecommunications and (2) the protection of the rights of others, namely
the interest of pluralism in Swiss broadcasting.' While the owners of the
Groppera station argued that the measures did not answer a pressing social
need,9" the court balanced the interests involved and considered the
margin of appreciation afforded to Member States in taking measures they
deemed appropriate.
The court listed four reasons for striking the balance in favor of the
Swiss government. First, most Swiss cable operators ceased transmitting
the Sound Radio programs after the 1983 Ordinance became effective.' 2
Second, the Swiss authorities never jammed the broadcasts. Third, the
measures were essentially taken against a Swiss cable company with
subscribers who all lived in Switzerland and could still receive the
programs of other stations. Finally, the action taken was not censorship
against the content or the tendencies of the programs, but a measure taken
against a station which could reasonably be held to operate from across the
Swiss border with the intent to circumvent Swiss telecommunications
law. 3
D. A Major Step
Despite the negative outcome for the applicants, the Groppera decision
can be considered as a major step because of the applicability of the second
paragraph of Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention to broadcasting
issues. Two months after Groppera, the European Court of Human Rights
87. Ie at 25 (para. 65).
88. "According to the Court, the scope of foreseeability and accessibility depends to a
considerable degree on the content of the instrument in issue, the field it is designed to cover, and
the number and status of those to whom it is addressed." Groppera, 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 26 (para. 68).
89. Id.
90. Both interests were invoked by the Swiss government as justifiable reasons for taking the
measures against the Groppera station. Id. at 27 (para. 69).
91. Id. at 27-28 (para. 71) (They even contended that it was tantamount to censorship or
jamming.).
92. See id. at I1 (para. 18).
93. 173 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (para. 73).
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issued another ruling in which Article 10 was applied in a broadcasting
case.9' This case also arose in Switzerland.
Autronic AG, a private company under Swiss law that specialized in
electronics, wanted to demonstrate some of its dish aerials at the Basel
Trade Fair in April 1982 by showing programs broadcast in the Soviet
Union via the G-Horizont satellite. Autronic obtained permission from the
Soviet embassy with the help of the Radio and Television Division of the
Head Office of the national Posts and Telecommunications Authority
("PT').' A request for a similar activity a few months later was denied
by the Division because it did not receive a reply from the embassy."
Autronic subsequently applied to the Radio and Television Division for
a declaratory ruling that the reception for private use of uncoded television
programs from satellites such as G-Horizont should not require the consent
of the broadcasting state's authorities. After submission to the Division,
and on appeal, the Swiss administrative courts denied the request, Autronic
filed a complaint with the European Commission of Human Rights.'
Autronic claimed that making the reception of such programs subject to
government approval infringed upon Article of the 10 ECPHRFF. The
Commission found that there was a violation of Article 10 and the case was
referred to the European Court of Human Rights.9"
E. Autronic: The Court's Decision
The court rejected the argument of the Swiss government that Autronic
AG could not claim protection under the right to freedom of expression of
Article 10 because it was pursuing purely economic and technical
objectives without an interest in the content of the programs: "[Article 10]
applies to 'everyone', whether natural or legal persons.... Furthermore,
Article 10 applies not only to the content of information but also to the
means of transmission or reception since any restriction imposed on the
means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart informa-
tion." 9 The court added that there was no ground for ascertaining the
94. Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
95. I& at 10 (para. 14).
96. Id. at 10-11 (para. 16).
97. Id. at 20 (para. 40).
98. Autroni¢, 178 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (para. 41) (decision of the Commission of Mar.
8. 1989).
99. It at 23 (para. 47).
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reason and purpose for which the right to receive information and ideas was
exercised.'
After reiterating its holding of Groppera on the meaning of the third
sentence of Article 10 § 1,01 the Court of Human Rights applied the
various tests of the second paragraph. As in Groppera, the court found that
the regulations invoked by the Swiss government were sufficiently
accessible. Nonetheless, the court expressed its doubts about the regula-
tions' status as "law." It avoided giving an opinion on this issue, however,
because it came to the conclusion that the interference with the rights of
Autronic was not justified."°
The Swiss government claimed two grounds for restricting Autronic's
rights, (1) the prevention of disorder in telecommunications and (2) the
prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence. 3
The government argued that the secrecy of telecommunications of Article
22 of the International Telecommunications Convention covered the
transmissions in question, because, even though they were not coded, they
were only intended for the Soviet audience and not for recipients in other
countries.
The court acknowledged the margin of appreciation enjoyed by
Member States in taking measures they deemed appropriate. But, it also
pointed to the need for European supervision and the strictness of this
supervision in relation to the importance of the rights at stake."' The
Swiss government maintained that the court should view the case in light
of the circumstances of 1982 and it should ignore the technical and legal
developments that had taken place since.0 5 This was particularly impor-
tant because, while in 1982 G-Horizont was the only satellite of its kind,
at the end of the 1980's several other telecommunications satellites
broadcasting television programs had come into service. On the legal front,
the European Convention on Transfrontier Television had been concluded
on May 5, 1989.' 6
The Court of Human Rights rejected the government's submission that
the special characteristics of telecommunications satellites justified the
interference." The court found that the nature of the broadcasts, i.e.,
100. Id.
101. Id. at 24 (par. 52).
102. Autronic, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (para. 57).
103. Id. at 26 (para. 58).
104. Id. at 26-27 (para. 61).
105. Id. at 27 (para. 62).
106. Id.
107. Autronic, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (para. 63).
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uncoded broadcasts intended for television viewers in the Soviet Union,
precluded description of them as "not intended forthe general public." The
court was not persuaded by the government's argument that imposing a
total ban on the reception of signals from telecommunications satellites was
the only way of ensuring the secrecy of international correspondence:
"Mhe Government had already conceded before the Commission that there
was no risk of obtaining secret information by means of dish aerials
receiving broadcasts from telecommunications satellites." '  In other
words, the interference with the rights of Autronic was not "necessary in
a democratic society."
IV. THE CASES PUT TOGETHER
A. A Major Boost to Broadcast Freedom?
At the outset of the 1990's, two bodies of case law on broadcasting
had been developed by the two highest European courts. The case law
focused mainly on considerations of an economic nature and had the
purpose of breaking open the traditional protectionist public service based
broadcasting systems of the various Member States of the EC. In the cases
which came before the European Court of Human Rights, the most
important question was whether broadcasting should be treated in the same
way as other forms of expression. Although the court left some room for
regulations of a purely technical nature, it essentially answered the question
in the affirmative.
On the basis of the cases discussed above, national broadcasting law
of the Member States of the EC has to comply with a number of condi-
tions:
(1) National law has to meet the requirements of the second paragraph of
Article 10 of the ECPHRFF, qualified only by the margin of apprecia-
tion left to each Member State. This margin is subject to European
supervision, however, because it involves fundamental rights;
(2) Every natural or legal person can claim the fundamental rights of
Article 10, irrespective of whether or not the content or the tendencies
of the signals transmitted are at stake;
(3) National broadcasting regulations may not discriminate against foreign
nationals or residents, except on grounds of public policy;
108. 1&
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(4) Regulations of an economic nature are likely to infringe upon the EEC
Treaty, even if they serve or are said to serve non-economic objec-
tives;
(5) On the other hand, a general non-discriminatory prohibition of
broadcast advertising is permitted and measures affecting the national
territory of an EC Member State only are not subject to the provisions
on the freedom to provide services of the EEC Treaty.
Examining this enumeration without knowledge of the underlying cases,
one could easily conclude that the opinions of the Court of Human Rights
in Groppera and Autronic were a major boost to the broadcasting freedom
in Europe, causing the abolition of all kinds of restrictive national
regulations. The fact of the matter is, however, that the two opinions had
a very limited impact on broadcasting activities in the various Member
States. The cases' limited impact may be due to several reasons.
First, issues of content were not at stake in either case. Groppera and
Autronic dealt with companies trying to enhance their commercial positions.
In Autronic in particular, it was obvious that the applicant wanted to
demonstrate its dish aerials to potential buyers. The content of the
programs picked up from the G-Horizont satellite was completely irrelevant.
The purpose of the owners of the Groppera radio station was to run a
commercial radio program with mostly light music and some information
directed at the younger people in the Zuirich listening area. The owners
were not trying to convey a message, yet they were still prevented from
broadcasting. Although at the time the Groppera station started operating,
the Swiss broadcasting corporation still had a monopoly, this was no longer
the case after the 1982 Ordinance created the opportunity for privately
owned stations to broadcast at the local level. Nonetheless, the Court of
Human Rights was correct in rejecting the Swiss government's argument
that the content of the message should be a factor in determining whether
the person who wants to convey it can claim Article 10 protection.
The second explanation for the limited impact of the Groppera and
Autronic opinions may be that the broadcasters in the Council of Europe
Member States do not consider themselves unduly restricted in their ability
to convey ideas and information. Those who feel otherwise may be
inclined to await the outcome of the current technical and legal develop-
ments.109
109. It should also be kept-in mind that it takes a long time before a case comes before the
Court of Human Rights. Parties first have to exhaust their national court system. ECPHRFF,
supra note 62, at 238 (art. 26).
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Finally, the real changes in European broadcasting appear to be
triggered mainly by the opinions of the Court of Justice of the EC. In the
cases addressed by this court, the content and the tendencies of the
programs as such were not at issue. They played a role only in that the
governments argued that the measures taken by them were necessary to
preserve the public broadcasting system as a vehicle for the transmission
of information, entertainment, and culture in the public interest. The
court's decisions focused on the issue of whether the national regulations
violated the free market principles of the EEC Treaty.
B. Broadcasters as Ordinary Entrepreneurs
Against the background of the European broadcasting systems of 1974,
the court in Sacchi took a major step by applying the freedom to provide
services and the anti-monopoly rules of the EEC Treaty to broadcasting.
Thus, the court treated broadcasting organizations as ordinary commercial
operations which provide one of the services mentioned in Article 60 of the
EEC Treaty. Article 60 lists four types of services: activities of an
industrial character, of a commercial character, of craftsmen, and of the
professions. Although this enumeration is not exhaustive, it is reasonably
representative."' Broadcasting is apparently considered as an activity of
a commercial character or something akin.
In order to fall under the definition of Article 60, a service has to be
"normally provided for remuneration..... In his report for the Federation
Internationale pour le Droit Europeen (FIDE) Congress of 1984, commenta-
tor Ivo E. Schwartz argued that there does not have to be a legal relation-
ship between the provider and the recipient of the service. 2 In the case
of broadcasting, this relationship is particularly important because, with the
exception of pay-television, programs are usually not paid for directly by
the viewers. Funding may come from advertising income, sponsors, and
other sources. But even if the viewers pay for the programs in the form of
a general broadcasting fee or a tax, they do not, and cannot, use all the
services. Nobody watches every program. Some people do not watch
television at all. Others tune in to foreign stations only.
Schwartz also draws attention to the definition of companies in Article
58 of the EEC Treaty. According to this provision, companies which are
110. See SCHWARtZ, supra note 20, at 9.
111. EEC TREATY arL 60.
112. d at 10.
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not for profit-making are not covered by the various economic freedoms of
the EEC Treaty. Although broadcasting associations are often organized
under public law and funded by public money, they also carry out certain
other activities with the purpose of creating some extra funds. Schwartz
adds that the expression "non-profit-making" is a "concept of Community
law within its own meaning, and not a concept of domestic law whose
meaning may vary from one Member State to another."'"
In other words, the concept of activities of an economic nature as
employed by the EEC Treaty is very broad and has little in common with
general economic notions. This also explains why the Court of Justice had
little difficulty in applying the economically oriented principles of the EEC
Treaty to the cases discussed above. Nonetheless, the EEC Treaty leaves
open the possibility of setting these principles aside in cases in which they
are outweighed by important considerations such as public health, public
security, and public policy."
4
C. The Court of Justice on Culture
The court, of course, recognizes these exceptions which consider the
public's welfare. In Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, the court was
able to avoid the cable regulations' implications when it stated that the
Dutch government had less restrictive and non-discriminatory means of
achieving its objectives of pluralism and non-commerciality. In Commis-
sion v. Netherlands,"5 the next case, however, the court was more
explicit. In that case, the court dealt with the Media Act which came into
force in 1988 as the successor to the 1967 Broadcasting Act, and with
113. Id. at4.
114. EEC TREATY art. 1. Schwartz points out that the exceptions of Article 56(1) do not
create a condition precedent to the acquisition of a right to supply a service, but the possibility
of imposing restrictions on rights deriving directly from the Treaty in individual cases in which
there is sufficient justification. It at 16.
115. Case 353/89, Commission v. Netherlands, reprinted in Bilage. 3 MEDIAFORUM 77 (1991)
(Neth.). This case has as its companion Case 288/89 Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening
Gouda et al. v. Commissariaat voor de Media, reprinted in Bilage, 3 MEDLAFORUM 81 (1991)
(Neth.). Case 288/89 was referred to the Court of Justice by the highest Dutch administrative
court (the Afdeling Rechtspraak Rad van State) and dealt with an appeal filed by a local cable
company against the decision of the Commissariaat voor de Media (the government agency
charged with broadcasting matters) to refuse the cable operator to retransmit certain foreign
programs. The opinions of the Court in both cases are identical with regard to the issue of the
retransmission of programs from abroad. Case No. 353/89 also involved the provision of the
Dutch Media Act obliging the broadcasting associations to use one particular institution for their
production facilities.
1993]
264 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
Articles 61 and 66 of this Act in particular. It came before the Court of
Justice upon the Commission's complaint that these provisions violated the
freedom to provide services under Articles 59 through 66 of the EEC
Treaty.
Article 66 was the revised version of the provision of the former Cable
Regulations which was the subject of the debate in the Cable Regulations
case. Under Article 66, Dutch cable operators were permitted to retransmit
programs broadcast by foreign broadcasting organizations. These programs
had to meet certain conditions, however, if they contained advertisements
directed at the Dutch market. Some of these conditions pertained to the
advertisements as such: no advertising on Sundays, a clear distinction
between advertisements and other programs, and, advertising should not
exceed five percent of the total broadcasting time. Other conditions dealt
with the way in which advertising was organized: advertising must be
administered by an independent legal person (i.e., not the broadcaster or the
cable operator); the broadcaster may not contribute to the profits of other
organizations; and he must use all the advertising income for his pro-
grams-'
1 6
In line with its decision in the Cable Regulations case, the Court of
Justice found that the conditions of the second category violated the
freedom to provide services of the EEC Treaty."7 The Dutch govern-
ment argued these conditions were identical to those applicable to the
Dutch broadcasters and that these conditions were intended to enhance its
cultural policies by limiting the influence of advertisers on the pro-
grams" 8 The court failed to see a relevant connection between these
cultural policies and the conditions on the structure of the foreign
broadcasting organizations." 9
As to the first category, the European Court acknowledged that
limitations on the broadcasting of advertisements may be justified by
compelling reasons of general interest!' ° The court said that such
limitations may be imposed to protect the consumer against too much
commercial advertising, or, in the context of cultural policies, to maintain
a certain quality of programs.' The court observed, however, that the
limitations only applied to the market of advertisements directed at the
116. MEDiAwEr art. 1 (Neth.) (Staatsblad 1987).






Dutch audience. In addition, the restrictions may be lifted for Dutch
language programs broadcast in Belgium and intended for the Dutch
spealdng public in that country."n
The court concluded by saying that, although to a lesser extent, the
provisions of Article 66 have the same objective as the former Cable
Regulations: the protection of the income to the STER. Such an objective
cannot be a justification for restricting the freedom to provide services. 3
D. The Obligation to Use Facilities
Although the European Court mentioned the cultural aspects, it again
essentially avoided treating the issue in a comprehensive manner. The
court went into more detail, however, when it dealt with the other issue of
the case, the question of whether the EEC Treaty was violated by the
preferential position the Dutch Media Act gave to the Nederlands
Omroepproduktie Bedriff ("NOB"). The NOB, or Netherlands Broadcast-
ing Production Company, owns and operates the facilities used by the
broadcasting associations. These facilities include not only studios,
technicians, cameras, equipment for shows, plays and sitcoms, but also a
movie archive, orchestras and choirs.
In the past, the broadcasters could make an almost unlimited use of the
NOB's services. Under the 1987 Media Act, the production company was
given independent commercial and legal status and the broa~casting
organizations had to pay for its services."l Although the broadcasters
were obliged to use the NOB's facilities, Article 61 of the Media Act
provided for an increase in the extent to which they were free to hire the
services of other institutions. During the proceedings, the government
informed the Commission and the court that the obligation to use the
NOB's services would be terminated on January 1, 1991, for television, and
on January 1, 1992, for radio.'2
These provisions did not satisfy the EEC Commission, which was of
the opinion that Article 61 discriminated against foreign production
companies and thus infringed upon the freedom to provide services of
Articles 59 through 66 of the EEC Treaty." 6 Article 61 was the second
target of the Commission's complaint against the Dutch government.
122. Case 353/89, Commission v. Netherlands, supra note 115, at 80.
123. Id at 80.
124. MEDIAWET art. 1 (Neth.) (Staatsblad 1987).
125. Case 353/89, Commission v. Netherlands, supra note 115, at 79.
126. Id at 78.
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The government argued that the measures were necessary to preserve
the cultural achievements of the past.'" An abrupt abolition of the
broadcasters' obligation to use the NOB's services would lead to the latter's
bankruptcy.'2 The government acknowledged that Article 61 of the
Media Act was not in accordance with the freedom to provide services.
But it contended that the provision was justified by compelling interests
such as the maintenance of the freedom of expression of the various social,
cultural, and religious trends of Dutch society. 29 By making available
all of its facilities, including movie archives, orchestras, and choirs, the
NOB enhanced the plurality and non-commerciality of the Dutch broadcast-
ing system. The government believed that these interests justified even
measures of an economic nature.1
30
The Court of Justice responded by holding:
Seen in this light, cultural policies may certainly be a compelling
reason of general interest justifying a restriction of the freedom
to provide services. The maintenance of a pluralist broadcasting
system, which is the objective of the Dutch policies, is connected
with the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, one of the fundamental rights protected
by Community law."'
But the court found that the provisions protecting the NOB's position went
beyond what was necessary to achieve the stated objectives. The pluralist
nature of the Dutch broadcasting system would not suffer if the broadcast-
ers would have the possibility of using other service companies.132 The
court agreed with the Commission that there was no need for obliging the
broadcasting organizations to hire the NOB's services if they really had an
interest in using them.
33
127. 1d. at 79.
128. IL
129. I&
130. Case 353189, Comnmissio




V. CULTURAL POLICIES AND THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES
A. Article 10 of the ECPHRFF and the EEC Treaty
The remaining question concerns what weight should be given to the
court's statement regarding the extent to which cultural policies may justify
measures restricting the freedom to provide services. Although the
statement was made in a general sense, the court also referred to the
position of the Dutch government in the underlying case. Nonetheless, in
the absence of more cases one can only speculate about the kind of
restrictions which, in the interest of a Member State's cultural policies, may
be imposed on the freedom to provide services. The preferential treatment
given to the Dutch NOB was also clearly unacceptable due to its monopo-
listic nature.'3
.A second element in the court's opinion is the reference to Article 10
of the ECPHRFF, formally the domain of the Council of Europe and the
Court of Human Rights, but adopted by the EC as a fundamental principle
of EC law.1 35 By connecting the maintenance of a pluralist broadcasting
system to Article of the 10 ECPHRFF, the Court of Justice interpreted this
provision. The question arises whether this interpretation comports with the
view bf the Court of Human Rights.
In the Groppera case, the Swiss government argued, inter alia, that the
interference with the activities of the Groppera station was intended to
protect the rights of others, "as it was designed to ensure pluralism, in
particular of information, by allowing a fair allocation of frequencies
internationally and nationally."136 The Court of Human Rights, noting
that the Commission of Human Rights expressed no view on this matter in
its report, merely found that "the interference in issue pursued both the
aims relied on, which were fully compatible with [Article 10 § 2], namely
the protection of the... telecommunications order and the protection of the
rights of others."'
37
When balancing the various interests involved, the court did not
elaborate on the pluralism issue in discussing the compatibility of the
government's measures with the "necessary in a democratic society" test.
134. Id at 79.
135. Article 10 was not only adopted by the Court but also by the Commission and the
Committee of Ministers. See Council Directive 89/552, 1989 OJ. (L 298) 23. See also
ScHWARrz, supra note 20, at 18.
136. Groppera, 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1990) (para. 69).
137. lit
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In other words, the Court of Human Rights seemed to favor a low-key
approach to the question of whether there is a connection between general
objectives such as pluralism and cultural policies, on the one hand, and
Article 10 on the other hand. The court's opinion certainly does not
provide much support for the position that pluralism and cultural policies
will be easily accepted as grounds for restricting the freedoms listed in the
first paragraph. Thus, the interpretation of Article 10 given by the Court
of Justice in EC Commission v. Netherlands could well exceed the scope
of this provision as viewed by the Court of Human Rights. Future opinions
will have to clarify this point.
B. Public Broadcasting and the European Treaties
What are the consequences for the compatibility of the traditional
public broadcasting systems with both the EEC Treaty and the Human
Rights Convention? Given the approach of the Court of Human Rights in
Groppera and Autronic, it seems that certain elements of these systems will
continue to be tolerated. But the applicability of the second paragraph of
Article 10 to broadcasting clearly limits national governments' ability to
regulate radio and television as extensively as in the past. In any case,
there is no ground for the position that the maintenance of a public
broadcasting system is mandated by Article 10 of the ECPHRFF.
The same may be said of the EEC Treaty. In the 1970's and the early
.1980's, the Court of Justice was still willing to accept measures protecting
traditional systems and principles. However, recent case law displays a
much more critical approach. This trend is indicated, not only by the cases
previously discussed, but also by the so-called Magill opinions issued by
the Court of First Instance of the EC in 1991.13' In these cases, provi-
sions affording a far-reaching copyright protection to English and Irish
program guides were found incompatible with the EEC Treaty.
Including the Magill cases, a number of cases on broadcasting issues
are currently pending before the Court of Justice and the Court of First
138. Case 69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 2 CEC (CCH) 114 (Ct. First Instance
1991); Case 70/89, British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, 2 CEC (CCH) 147 (Ct. First
Instance 1991); Case 76/89, Independent Television Prod., Ltd. v. Commission, 2 CEC (CCH) 174
(Ct. First Instance 1991). See also Brenda Sufrin, Comment on the Magill Case, ENT. L. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 67, 68.
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Instance of the EC.139  Several of them deal with attempts by public
broadcasting systems to protect their interests against those of private
organizations trying to enter the market. For example, in Screensport v.
EBU,'1 a commercially operated transnational satellite television sports
channel service, challenged both the exclusivity of rights to sports events
acquired and sponsored by the European Broadcasting Union ("EBU") and
the refusal of the EBU to grant Screensport sublicenses.
The EBU is primarily an association of public broadcasting organiza-
tions established in 1950.41 All members participate in an institutional-
ized exchange of television programs, including sports programs, via a
European network ("Eurovision"), which is based on reciprocity." The
bulk of the exchanges made under Eurovision consists of sports pro-
grams." In 1988, sixteen EBU members entered into a Eurosport
Consortium Agreement and subsequently began a joint venture with Sky
Television, a commercial broadcasting organization registered in England.
The purpose of the joint venture was to create a European satellite
television service for sports programs ("Eurosport").1" Because of the
close connections with the EBU and the public broadcasting organizations
of the various members, Eurosport was able to reserve for itself a strong
and almost exclusive position in the market of sports programs."
Outsiders such as Screensport were left with minor portions of this market.
This result was even more striking since only a relatively small portion of
139. Appeals were filed against the decisions of the Court of First Instance in the Magill
cases, which will now have to be dealt with by the Court of Justice. In addition, the Court of
Justice will give opinions on an appeal against a decision of the Commission on certain
broadcasting practices in Belgium, Case 211/91, Commission v. Belgium, 1991 OJ. (C 245) 13;
on a reference made by an Italian appellate court in a case concerning the nature of the television
market, Case 170/90, the Odeon case, 1990 O.J. (C 169) 16; and on a reference made by the
highest administrative court of the Netherlands in a case on the investment of capital in the
commercial broadcasting organization RTL- made by one of the public broadcasting associations,
Case 148191, the Veronica case, 1991 OJ. (C 189) 12. The Court of First Instance will give
opinions on appeals against: (1) a decision of the EC Commission in Screensport v. EBU
Members, Case 91/130, 1991 OJ. (C 153) 25, dealing with the EBU's exclusive position with
regard to the broadcast of sports events; and (2) a decision of the Commission in a case dealing
with the exclusiveness of movies on German television, Case 157/89, Commission v. Nefico, 1991
O.J. (C 14) 32.
140. 1991 OJ. (C 14) 32.
141. 1991 OJ. (L 63) 32 (para. 8).
142. Id. (para. 9).
143. Id. at 34.
144. Id. at36.
145. Id. at 38.
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the available material (about fifteen percent) was actually broadcast and
Eurosport refused to issue sublicenses.'4
The EC Commission was of the opinion that the joint venture
negatively affected the free trade between the Member States and thus
constituted an infringement of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.147 The
Commission left open the possibility that "the public mission obligations
imposed by the Member States on their national broadcasting organizations
render them undertakings entrusted with services of general economic
interest."'" But, the Commission said, "it is highly doubtful that, given
the national character of these obligations, they could be interpreted as
extending to transnational activities of a collective nature such as Euro-
sport.'
'14 9
The EC Commission also rejected the position taken by Eurosport that
the consumers in effect benefited from its sports channel. The Commission
pointed to the fact that Sky Television would probably have started its own
sports channel had it not entered into the underlying cooperation with the
EBU."5° Finally, the Commission failed to see any technical or economic
improvement as claimed by Eurosport."' Eurosport filed an appeal
against the Commission's decision with the Court of First Instance.' s2
In another case, the Court of Justice will have to rule on various
restrictions on the freedom to provide services imposed by the legislature
of the Flemish community in Belgium.'53 The law of this community
provides, inter alia, that television programs from abroad which are
transmitted by cable must be in one of the languages of the broadcasting
state, that prior authorization is required for the transmission by cable of
programs of private broadcasting corporations from abroad, and that fifty-
one percent of the capital of the commercial station of the Flemish
community must be reserved to publishers of Dutch language periodicals
registered in the Dutch-speaking area or in the bilingual area of Brus-
146. 1991 OJ. (L 63) 32 (para. 12).
147. Id. at 42.
148. Id. at 43.
149. Id.
150. Id at 43.
151. 1991 OJ. (L 63) 32 (para. 71).
152. See supra text accompanying note 138. For a discussion on sports and information
monopolies, see generally SPORT EN INFORMATIEMONOPOLIES (Willem F. Korthals Altes et al.
eds., 1991).
153. 1991 OJ. (L 63) 32.
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sels.' 1 The stated purpose of these measures is the protection of the
culture and the language of the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. But the
EC Commission claims that the provisions unjustifiably infringe upon the
freedom to provide services of the EEC Treaty.155
VI. CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS
It appears that public broadcasting, as it has existed for so many years
in almost every European country, is challenged in all of its major aspects:
exclusivity, non-commerciality, ownership. Even measures with the stated
purpose of protecting culture, pluralism, and language are under strict
scrutiny of the EC Commission, which vigorously applies the economic
principles of the EEC Treaty to the laws and practices of the Member
States.
It goes too far to say that the institutions of the EC are at the point of
prohibiting national public broadcasting systems on the basis of the Treaty.
But little is left if such systems are stripped of their most characteristic
features. The cases show that the freedom to provide services is a powerful
tool in the demolition of traditional barriers to broadcasting freedom. At
stake is not the broadcaster's right to disseminate suppressed information,
but his economic ability to exploit a commercial broadcasting organization.
This applies not only to the cases dealt with by the institutions of the
European (Economic) Community, but also to those of the Court of Human
Rights of the Council of Europe, which is more human rights oriented.
Economic principles have become the most important factor in
European broadcasting. Arguments of culture, pluralism, and non-
commerciality are mainly supplied by governments attempting to preserve
their national public broadcasting systems. Perhaps, it is fortunate that
broadcast content does not play a role in the cases and the debates, but that
may still come.
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